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A graduate-level textbook on the theory of auctions, a branch of game theory that models how bidders behave and how sellers design the rules of sale. It covers the standard single-object auction formats, such as first-price, second-price, English and Dutch auctions, along with the mathematical tools needed to analyse them. It also extends the analysis to multi-object and double auctions. The book's central claim is that the revenue and efficiency properties of an auction depend heavily on its format and on what bidders know about each other's values. Under the standard assumptions it develops revenue equivalence, the result that different formats can yield the same expected revenue, and shows where that result fails, for example under risk aversion, asymmetric bidders, or common values. It then treats optimal auction design, in which the seller sets reserve prices or allocation rules to maximise revenue, and examines how these conclusions change when more complex settings are considered.

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Details

First published
2002
ISBN
9780123745071
Editions known
8 at Open Library
Open Library
OL7940570W

Auction theoryAuctionsAuktionstheorieGame theoryMathematical models

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