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Cover of The calculus of consent

The calculus of consent

James M. Buchanan · 1962

Politics, economics and society › Authority and institutions

#13,393 most recommended

About the book

A study of the logical foundations of constitutional democracy, co-written with Gordon Tullock, that examines how collective decisions are made and what rules govern them. It covers voting and majority rules, the costs of reaching collective agreement, and how individuals might choose constitutional arrangements. Individuals choosing constitutional rules without knowing their future position will weigh the costs of decision-making against the expected costs of being overruled, which can justify majority or qualified-majority rules rather than unanimity. The authors ground political analysis in the choices of individuals, treating the state as a set of rules agreed to by people rather than as an organism with its own purposes. The argument shifts evaluation from individual policy outcomes to the constitutional rules that produce them.

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  • published 1962
  • articles in 6 languages
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Details

First published
1962
ISBN
9780472091003
Editions known
2 at Open Library
Open Library
OL10432800W

Decision makingDemocracyDemocratieEconomic developmentPolitieke besluitvormingVoteVoting

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